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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

KAREN DIANE ANDERSON BAGGS, 1
Plaintiff and Appellant, I
ase No.
13422

vs.
DENNIS R. ANDERSON,
Defendant-Respondent and
Cross Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
AND CROSS APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF NATURE (M-

ASK

Appellant brought suit against Respondent to domesticate a Wyoming Divorce Decree and to obtain judgment for accrued child support and attorney's fees.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
On January 5, 1973 Appellant obtained judgment by
default domesticating a Wyoming Decree of Divorce and
obtaining judgment for accrued child support in the sum
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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of $1,900.00, together with Court costs of $24.30 and
attorney's fees of $300.00. Said judgment was set aside
March 5, 1973, and the case was tried before the Honorable Calvin Gould, sitting without a jury, on May 8,1973.
On May 25, 1973 judgment was granted domesticating
the Wyoming Divorce Decree and awarding Appellant
child support accruing from December, 1971 through
April, 1973, in the sum of $3,300.00. Each of the parties
were ordered to pay his own costs and attorney's fees.
Said judgment was thereafter amended on June 29, 1973,
disallowing the child support accruing prior to July 25,
1972, and awarding judgnient in favor of Appellant for
child support accruing from July 25, 1972 through April
25, 1973, in the sum of $1,800.00 with the provision that
Appellant was enjoined from garnishing or executing
against Respondent's assets or from otherwise enforcing
said judgment so long as Respondent pays at least $100.00
per month on said judgment.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent and Cross Appellant seeks affirmation
of the judgment denying Appellant child support accruing from December, 1971 through July 25, 1972, together
with the decision that Appellant is not entitled to attorney's fees herein. Said Respondent and Cross Appellant
seeks reversal of that portion of the judgment awarding
Appellant child support which accrued between July 25,
1972 and December 14, 1972.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
Defendant-Respondent and Cross Appellant, hereinaftter referred to as Respondent, does not agree fully wilh
the Statement of Facts as presented by Appellant ami
will herein recite his interpretation of the facts and will
specifically refute facts set forth in Appellant's brief
which he controverts.
On June 24, 1970, Respondent was awarded a Decree
of Divorce against Appellant in Natrona County, Wyoming. Appellant was awarded custody of the three minor
children of the parties, together with $200.00 per month
child support. Respondent paid said child support regularly until October, 1971, when Appellant made plans
to remarry. Sometime prior to Novembei I, i^TL Respondent met with Appellant's fiau.vu, Kichir Ri .
and discussed the role each would play regarding ^
children of the parties in the future. Mr. Baggs advised
Respondent that he did not want Respondent to visit
the children thereafter nor did he want his assistance in
the form of child support (T - 50-51). On November 1,
1971, Appellant and Respondent met and agreed that Respondent would not visit the children in the future and
he would be relieved of all child support obligations "''
- 52 & R - 52). Two written memorandums of said agi
ment were signed by both of the parties, one being on
the last page of a copy of the Wyoming Divorce Decree
and the other being on a paper napkin. Contrary to
Appellant's Statement of Facts, there is no evidence that
she did not intend to relieve Respondent of his obligation
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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of child support. On the contrary, Appellant testified
that she was sober at the time she entered into the agreement and knew what she was doing (T - 32). There was
no coercion or force of any type used to induce her to
enter into the agreement (T - 52). When Appellant
signed the memorandum, she clearly knew she was signing a release and even copied it over on a napkin so she
would have it available to know what she had signed (T
-35).
To this point there had been no discussion between
the parties regarding adoption of the children by Appellant's future husband. Approximately one week before
Appellant's remarriage on November 19, 1971, the parties met at lunch with Appellant's fiancee, Richie Baggs,
and there was some discussion at that time regarding the
possibility of a future adoption of the children by Mr.
Baggs. Respondent did not at that time reject the idea
(T - 61) but there was no serious discussion or any real
conversation about an adoption until June, 1972 (T 23).
In reliance upon the November 1, 1971 agreement,
Appellant stopped visiting the children and did not see
them again until January, 1973. In reliance upon the
agreement he also stopped paying child support (T - 52).
In further reliance upon said agreement, Respondent
changed his circumstances materially. He moved from
a $40.00 per month apartment and signed a year's lease
on another apartment for $175.00 per month (T - 53-54).
In the summer of 1972, he also purchased a new automoDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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bile at a cost of $3,750.00 with monthly payments of
$118.00 per month (T - 54 & T - 64). In February, 1972,
he incurerd a debt for $600.00 on furniture with monthly
payments of $25.60 (T - 65). Then in August, 1972, he
incurred a debt Consolidation Loan in the sum of $1,200.00
with monthly payments of $90.00 per month (T - 65).
Respondent would not have changed his circumstances
and incurred said debts had he not understood that he
had been relieved of child support payments of $200.00
per month (T - 54).
In June, 1972, Appellant and her husband retained
Attorney James Z. Davis to file a petition for adoption
of the children by Mr. Baggs (T - 41). There was no
discussion at that time regarding the collection of support arrearages and the Baggs' only purpose in retaining
the attorney was to commence adoption proceedings (T
- 42, 43). At that point, Appellant and her husband were
still acquiescing in the non-payment of support by Respondent and anticipated that Mr. Baggs would adopt
the children (T - 44).
During June, 1972, the first serious conversations between the parties about adoption of the children by Mr.
Baggs were held (T - 23, 24) and at that time Respondent appeared somewhat hesitant about consenting to an
adoption (T - 24). Only after this hesitancy was made
known did Appellant make demand for the payment of
accrued child support (T - 47). This was done formally
by letter from Appellant's attorney to Respondent dated
July 25, 1972. From the date of the agreement between
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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the parties on November 1, 1971, until July, 1972, no
request was made of Respondent for child support.
On September 14, 1972, Appellant's attorney again
made demand on Respondent for accrued support, and
on September 27, 1972, Appellant filed a Complaint
against Respondent to domesticate the Wyoming Divorce
Decree and to obtain a judgment for accrued child support, but Respondent was not served with process at
that time. Thereafter, further conversations were held
regarding the possibility of adoption and finally in the
early part of December, 1972, Respondent agreed that
he would go to Court and consent to an adoption. When
Respondent finally got to Court, he could not bring himself to consent to the adoption, and on December 14,1972,
shortly after his refusal to consent to the adoption in
Court, Respondent was served with the Complaint which
had been filed on September 27,1972.
During the entire period that Respondent paid no
child support to Appellant the children were supported
by Appellant's new husband who provided for all of their
material needs and was very generous in his financial
assistance. The children did not want for any of the
necessities of life and Mr. Baggs provided all of their
comforts including a new home, two automobiles, and
a Country Club membership (T - 20). During this period
Mr. Baggs was employed as a stockbroker with Merrill,
Lynch, and had a salary of $700.00 per month until May,
1972, when he was raised to $800.00 per month (T - 40,
41).
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Judgment by default was entered against Respondent on aJnuary 5, 1973, wherein the Wyoming Divorce
Decree was made the judgment of the Utah Court and
judgment for $1,900.00 delinquent support was entered
against Respondent, together with Court costs of $24.30
and attorney's fees of $300.00 (R - 16). Pursuant to Respondent's Motion and hearing thereon, said default
judgment was set aside on March 5, 1973 (R - 50). On
May 8, 1973, the case was tried in the District Court of
Weber County before the Honorable Calvin Gould and
on May 25, 1973, said Court domesticated the Wyoming
Divorce Decree and granted judgment in favor of Appellant for child support accruing from December, 1971
through April, 1973, in the sum of $3,300.00. Each of the
parties was ordered to pay his own costs and attorney's
fees (R - 55, 56). Six days thereafter, on May 31, 1973,
Respondent filed his Motion to Amend Judgment which
was heard on June 20, 1973, and pursuant thereto the
judgment was amended on June 29, 1973, disallowing the support accruing prior to July 25, 1972, on
the grounds that Respondent relied on the agreement
between the parties that he would not be required to
pay support in exchange for not visiting the children and
Appellant made no demand for payment of support during said period and Respondent changed his position by
increasing his standard of living and incurring additional
expenses in reliance thereon. (See Findings, Facts and
Conclusions of Law dated February 14, 1974.) Judgment
against Respondent was allowed to stand for child supDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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port accruing from July 25, 1972 through April 25, 1973
in the sum of $1,800.00 and Appellant was enjoined from
garnishing or executing against Respondent's assets or
from otherwise enforcing said judgment so long as Respondent pays at least $100.00 per month on said judgment ( R - 9 3 ) .
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN
FINDING THAT APPELLANT WAS ESTOPPED FROM ENFORCING THE PAYMENT OF BACK INSTALLMENTS OF
CHILD SUPPORT ACCRUING FROM DECEMBER, 1971 THROUGH JULY, 1972.
Respondent will answer Points I and II of Appellant's Argument together.
It is recognized by a majority of
United States that a husband may not
past due installments of child support
laches or acquiescence on the part of
A. L. R. 886 where it is stated:

the Courts in the
be required to pay
on the grounds of
the wife. See 137

"It would seem, from a perusal of the cases,
that it is recognized by at least a majority of
the courts that circumstances may be such as to
enable a husband to avoid payment of permanent alimony or support and maintenance of
children allowed by decree or order of court, or
at any rate payment of past due installments
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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thereof, on the ground of laches or acquiescence
on the part of the wife."
This is further emphasized in 57 A. L. R. 2d 1143
where it is stated:
"There is ample authority in support of the
proposition that an agreement between divorced
spouses by which the former husband, for a valid
consideration, is released from his obligations
to pay child support to his former wife as previously decreed in the divorce suit, is valid as
between the former spouses, and precludes her
from enforcing the child support provisions of
the decree." (Cases cited)
The annotation goes on to state on page 1144:
"More specifically, it has been held that the
former wife may release her husband from his
obligations under the child support provisions
of a divorce decree so long as the interests of the
child are not affected and only an obligation personal to her is involved." (Cases cited including
the Utah case of Larsen v. Larsen, 5 Utah 2d
224, 300 P. 2d 596 [1956].)
Utah follows the majority rule and in the case of
Larsen v. Larsen, 5 Utah 2d 224, 300 P. 2d 596 (1956);
Rehearing, 9 Utah 2d 160, 340 P. 2d 421 (1959), the facts
are remarkably similar to those in the instant case. There,
the husband obtained a decree of divorce from the wife,
who was awarded custody of their minor child and
awarded $35.00 per month child support. Some years
after the divorce was granted the wife sought to obtain
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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a judgment against the husband for accrued child support and the husband alleged that his failure to make
support payments was due to the fact that the wife had
previously told him that she was married and her new
husband would support the child and that all she wanted
from the father was that he should refrain from trying
to see her or the child. Because of such representations,
the father alleged he had remarried and taken on other
obligations which he would not have undertaken had he
known she would demand all moneys which were payable
under the decree.
The trial Court found that the husband had not made
the payments as ordered by the divorce decree from June,
1947 until June, 1955, and held that the wife was entitled to a judgment for amounts due for that period for
the use and benefit of the child.
The Utah Supreme Court reversed the trial Court
and remanded the case for findings on the issues of laches,
acquiescence or estoppel.
On page 598 of 300 P. 2d the Court stated:
"In Price v. Price, we held that because the
state is interested in the child's welfare the parents cannot effectively release future payments
of support money by agreeing with the other to
that effect. However, this does not mean that
a mother may not by her actions or representations, or both, preclude herself from recovering
past due installments of support money to reimburse her for money which she has spent for the
support of the child. Where the father's failure
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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to make such payments was induced by her representations or actions and where as a result of
such actions or representations the father has
been lulled into failing to make such payments
and into changing his position which he would
not have done but for such representations, and
that as a result of such failure to pay and change
in his conditions it will cause him great hardship
and injustice if she is allowed to enforce the payment of such back installments, she may be
thereby estopped from enforcing the payment of
such back installments." (Last emphasis added,)
The Court then went on to state that:
"If the child has been the beneficiary of
equivalent support and education so that the
mother is entitled to receive all of said past due
support money, she should be free to release,
compromise or waive that which is hers. But if
the child has been provided bare shelter and
food and denied the benefit of proper clothes
and dental and medical care, then the mother
should not be free to waive that portion of past
due support money that the child has not received. The authorities cited above hold that
this doctrine is applicable to this extent. It is
the prerogative of the trial court to determine
these facts and if he finds that facts exist to
justify equitable estoppel, he should apply that
doctrine and relieve the father from payment of
the installments to the extent indicated."
Upon rehearing, the trial Court held that the wife
was estopped from claiming any payments for the period
from June, 1947 to and including December 31, 1950,
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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and judgment was entered accordingly. This judgment
was affirmed by the Utah Supreme Court in 1959 at 9
Utah 2d 160, 340 P. 2d 421.
In the instant case, the children have been well provided with all of their material needs by their mother's
second husband and have not been denied the benefit
of proper clothes and dental and medical care. Their comforts included a new home, two automobiles and a Country Club membership (T - 20). During this period Mr.
Baggs had an income between $700.00 and $800.00 per
month (T - 40, 41). It is clear in the instant case that
the children have been the beneficiary of equivalent support and education so that their mother would be entitled to receive all of the past due support money to use
as she sees fit, and accordingly she should be free to
release, compromise, or waive that which is hers.
The trial Court herein, in accordance with the Larsen
case, correctly found that the Respondent relied upon the
representations of Appellant and her second husband to
the effect that they would not expect Respondent to pay
child support in consideration of him not visiting the
children and leaving them alone. The Court further correctly found that in reliance thereon Respondent ceased
visiting the children,stopped the payment of child support, and changed his circumstances by incurring financial indebtedness which he would not have taken on had
he understood he still had a responsibility to support the
children.
Appellant's argument that the agreement of NovemDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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ber 1, 1971 is not a valid contract, is immaterial inasmuch
as it is not necessary that there be a valid contract in
order to constitute an estoppel. In the Larsen case the
Court did not question whether the agreement of the
wife to forego the payment of child support in exchange
for the husband not visiting the children constituted a
valid contract, but the Court rather determined that
such a representation by the wife which caused the husband to change his circumstances to his detriment in reliance thereon estopped the wife from later coming back
and collecting the accrued support. The trial Court was
correct in determining that the same rule is applicable in
the instant case.
Appellant's argument that the agreement was extorted from Appellant under duress is not valid. Appellant's own testimony was that she was sober at the time
she entered into the agreement and knew what she was
doing (T - 32) and Respondent testified that there was
no coercion or force of any type used to induce Appellant
to enter into the agreement (T - 52). Had Appellant
actually been coerced into making the agreement because
of her need of money, she could have repudiated the
agreement as soon as she received the money, but this
she never did. The trial Judge, who was present and able
to determine the demeanor of the parties, was correct in
determining that there was no duress.
Appellant's argument that under the case of Price
v. Price, 4 Utah 2d 153, 289 P. 2d 1044 (1955), future
support cannot be the subject of a bargain and sale beDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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tween husband and wife, is correct. This rule, however,
is not applicable in the present case as the question here,
as in the Larsen case, is whether Appellant is estopped
from collecting accrued child support. Appellant's Complaint filed in September, 1972, did not seek the collection of future support but rather sought to collect child
support which had accrued prior thereto. Appellant's
allegation found on page 6 of her brief that "In the instant case, defendant is relying on an agreement which
related in no way to arrearages, but to future payments,"
is just not true.
Appellant's reference in Point II of her argument
that plaintiff's acquiescence in the instant case was for
a period of only seven months "while all cases indulging
an estoppel theory invariably involve many years of acquiescence," is without merit.. In none of the cases cited
by Appellant does the Court state that an acquiescence
in the non-payment of support must continue for a stated
period of time in order to constitute a valid estoppel.
Whether the acquiescence is for a period of one month
or for a period of ten years is completely immaterial.
Appellant's argument on page 7 of her brief that the
case of Larsen v. Larsen has been "thoroughly immasculated by later cases" is not true. None of the cases cited
by Appellant overrule or in any way modify the holding
of the Larsen case and it has stood without dispute as
the law in this state since 1956.
The case of French v. Johnson, 16 Utah 2d 360, 401
P. 2d 315 (1965), cited on pages 6 and 7 of Appellant's
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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brief holds that the failure of a former wife to request
support payments from her former husband for a prolonged period does not raise an estoppel and the Court
distinguished the Larsen case and held that "It (Larsen)
has no application to the facts of this (French) case."
(Parenthetical insertions added.) It is interesting to note
that two of the Justices (Crockett, J. and McDonough,
J.) dissented in the French case and concluded that even
under the facts of that case the former wife should not
have been able to collect delinquent support.
The Utah Supreme Court also distinguished the case
of McClure v. Dowell, 15 Utah 2d 324, 392 P. 2d 624
(1964), cited on pages 6 and 7 of Appellant's brief, from
the Larsen case. In the McClure case the former husband
of the plaintiff did not make support payments for a period of two years because plaintiff concealed herself with
the children and defendant did not know where to pay
the support. The Utah Supreme Court again distinguished
the Larsen case and stated that Larsen was "inapropos
as applied to the facts of this case." The facts of the
McClure case also make it inapropos as applied to the
facts of the instant case.
The case of Hall v. Hall, 7 Utah 2d 413, 326 P. 2d
707 (1958), cited on page 7 of Appellant's brief is also
distinguished from the Larsen case. In the Hall case the
mother of the children concealed her whereabouts from
the father and claimed that she did not "seek out defendant to require payment because she was trying to enjoy a peaceful life and it was not worth it to her at the
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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time." The father in that case attempted to rely on the
Larsen case to create an estoppel. The Court held that
there was no "representation to defendant that he would
not be held accountable for the support money, as was
the basis of the Larsen decision," and the Court refused
to find an estoppel. The facts of the instant case are completely different from those in Hall but are almost identical to the facts in Larsen, as previously indicated.
POINT II.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN
FINDING THAT APPELLANT IS NOT ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY'S FEES FOR DOMESTICATING THE WYOMING DECREE
AND FOR HER SUBSEQUENT LEGAL ACTION IN UTAH.
There was no evidence whatsoever presented at the
trial of this case in support of Appellant's prayer for
$300.00 attorney's fees in domesticating the Wyoming
decree and seeking accrued support. The law does not
provide that a woman is inherently entitled to attorney's
fees simply because the case is one involving a matrimonial action. The general rule is that a wife is not entitled
to an allowance as suit money to maintain her divorce
suit where she has sufficient means of her own. See 35
A. L. R. 1101. The financial circumstances of the parties
is a factor to be given great weight by the Court. See
24 Am. Jur. 2d 718, wherein it is stated as follows:
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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"The financial circumstances of the parties
have an important bearing on the questions
whether attorney's fees and suit money should
be awarded and, if so, how much. The primary
rule is that the making of such allowances to a
wife depends upon her needs and the ability of
husband to satisfy them. For example, if the
wife is the plaintiff, the court will award reasonable attorney's fees and suit money if she is
without funds and her husband has sufficient
means to stand the expense." (Emphasis added)
In the Utah case of Alldredge v. Alldredge, 229 P.
2d 681, 119 Utah 504 (1951), it is stated that:
"The reason for permitting a wife suit money
to defend an action for divorce rests on the
ground that the wife normally has no separate
estate from which to pay for bringing or defending the action . . . Not to allow the wife expenses
and counsel fees would in the majority of cases
work an injustice by denying her the power to
enforce any marital right she may have."
In the instant case, Appellant has remarried, is living
in a new home, has a membership to the Country Club,
is able to drive two automobiles, and the Court did not
err in finding that she has sufficient means to pay her
own attorney's fees incurred in these proceedings.
It is further stated in 24 Am. Jur. 2d 695, as follows:
"Whether an allowance of suit money and
counsel fees shall be paid in the case at bar
rests in the judicial discretion of the court, to
be exercised in view of the conditions and cirDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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cumstances of each case, and an abuse of
discretion is necessarily subject to review.
less, however, there is clearly an abuse of
discretion, the decree will not ordinarily be
turbed on appeal" (Emphasis added)

the
Unthe
dis-

There is no evidence in the present case that the
trial Court abused its discretion in refusing Appellant's
prayer for attorney's fees.
POINT III.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN REFUSING TO FIND THAT RESPONDENT
INDUCED APPELLANT TO TEMPORARILY FOREGO ENFORCEMENT OF HIS
SUPPORT OBLIGATION BY AGREEING
TO ALLOW APPELLANT'S HUSBAND TO
ADOPT THE CHILDREN.
The agreement entered into between the parties on
November 1, 1971, did not contemplate in any way that
there would ever be an adoption of the children by Appellant's new husband. The verbal agreement between
the parties was merely that Respondent would forego
his right to visit the children and would be relieved of
further obligation to pay child support on their behalf.
This was confirmed by the written memorandum which
provides that Respondent would be absolved of all of his
responsibilities under the decree (including child support) and would give up all rights under the decree (including visitation). There was never any discussion beDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

19
tween the parties regarding the adoption of the children
until after the agreement was entered into and the discussion of adoption was only of a casual nature until
June, 1972, when the first serious discussions about adoption took place ( T - 2 3 ) .
POINT IV.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN
HEARING RESPONDENT'S MOTION TO
AMEND JUDGMENT.
The trial Court entered its order awarding Appellant
judgment for all requested arrearages on May 25, 1973.
Respondent filed his Motion to Amend Judgment six
days thereafter, on May 31, 1973, well within the ten
days permitted by Rule 59 (e) U. R. C. P.
Rule 59 (a) requires only that a cause set out therein
must be presented in order for the Court to grant a new
trial. There is no such requirement that one of the causes
be shown in order to justify an alteration or amendment
of judgment pursuant to Rule 59 (e).
Notwithstanding this, Respondent's Motion to
Amend Judgment clearly recited that the "judgment is
contrary to and against Utah law as set forth in the Utah
cases . . ." (R - 82). Rule 59 (a) (6) states that one of
the causes for a new trial is "Insufficiency of the evidence
to justify the verdict or other decision, or that it is against
law." (Emphasis added.) Respondent's Motion to Amend
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clearly stated that its cause was that the judgment was
contrary to and against Utah law.
POINT V.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT APPELLANT WAS ESTOPPED
FROM COLLECTING CHILD SUPPORT
WHICH ACCRUED FROM JULY 25, 1972
UNTIL DECEMBER 14, 1972.
The trial Court was correct in finding an acquiescence
by Appellant in the non-payment of support by Respondent through July 25, 1972 because there was no demand
made for the payment of support until that time. Respondent submits that the acquiescence in non-payment
by Appellant actually continued until December 14, 1972
when Respondent was served with Appellant's Complaint
to domesticate the Wyoming Divorce Decree. Although
Appellant made formal request through her attorney for
the payment of accrued support on July 25, 1972 and
again on September 14,1972, neither of the parties actually construed this as a demand for support, but rather as
a means of pressuring Respondent into consenting to an
adoption (T - 55). That Appellant had this intention is
clearly evidenced by her answer to the question:
"So you led him to believe along here that what
you wanted was a consent to the adoption, and
you would not pursue the matter of back support so long as he paid the attorney's fees in
connection with the adoption?
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Answer: Yes, sir" ( T - 2 8 ) .
When Appellant's attorney again made written request for the payment of accrued support on September
14, 1972, it is clear that the purpose of this demand was
to coerce Respondent into consenting to an adoption as
evidence by the fact that on September 29, 1972, Appellant and her attorney executed a release, wherein, for the
consideration of $322.00 attorney's fees for the adoption,
they released all claims against Respondent for support
arrearages (R - 60 & T - 28). Contrary to Appellant's
Statement of Facts there is no evidence that Respondent
agreed to begin payments and to make up the arrearages.
The filing of Appellant's Complaint on September
27, 1972 cannot be construed as a demand for the payment of accrued support inasmuch as Respondent was not
even aware that the Complaint was filed until he was
served with process on December 14, 1972. At the time
Respondent went to Court in the early part of December,
1972, to consent to an adoption Appellant was still acquiescing in the non-payment of support by Respondent
and expected only that he would pay attorney's fees in
connection with the adoption. This is evidenced by
Appellant's answers to the following questions:
"Q. Well now, there was an understanding, was
there not, finally that he would come into Court
and would consent to the adoption. And at that
point there was no talk about him having to pay
you any money in the way of delinquent amounts,
was there?
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A. Right.
Q. It was just a matter of him coming into
Court and agreeing to the adoption, isn't that
true?
A. We did ask him for the attorney's fees we
had entailed since June when one day he wanted
to sign and the next he didn't.
Q. I see. Your understanding at that point
was that you wanted him to pay your attorney's
fees in connection with the adoption as well?
A. Yes" (T - 27, 28).
When Respondent finally got to Court he could not
bring himself to consent to the adoption.
"Q. What happened when you got here? What
was your attitude when you got here?
A. Well, I felt like I was doing the wrong thing
and a bad thing, and I couldn't — when I got
there, I couldn't do it.
Q. What is your feeling about a relationship
with your children at the present time?
A. That I won't sign the adoption papers, and
that I want to see them very often" (T - 56).
It is clear from the facts that had Respondent agreed
to the adoption at the Court hearing in December, 1972,
Appellant would not thereafter have served the Complaint to collect accrued child support and Respondent
submits that the first and only conduct of Appellant that
was construed by either party as a formal demand for
the payment of support was the serving of the Complaint
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upon Respondent on December 14,1972. Up to that point
he had continuously been led to believe that he would
not be required to pay accrued child support.
CONCLUSION
The trial Court correctly ruled that Appellant was
estopped from collecting child support which accrued between December, 1971 and July 25, 1972, and the Court
was further correct in amending its original judgment
to this effect. The trial Court further ruled correctly that
Appellant was not entitled to attorney's fees in these
proceedings.
The trial Court erred, however, in ruling that Appellant was not estopped from collecting child support which
accrued from July 25, 1972 through December 14, 1972,
and it is respectfully submitted that the facts and law
compel a reversal of the trial Court's ruling that Appellant
was entitled to child support which accrued during the
latter period.
Respectfully submitted,
FROERER, HOROWITZ,
PARKER, THORNLEY,
CRITCHLOW & JENSEN
By C. Gerald Parker
Attorney for Respondent
2610 Washington Blvd.
Ogden, Utah 84401
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